

MEASURING PUBLIC INTEGRITY

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If democratic states are to endure, reliably uphold law-based rule, safeguard human rights, and offer their citizens reasonable opportunities for betterment, such states must govern not only democratically but *effectively* as well. A deepening sense of this truth helps to explain why the concept of *good governance* has now become a major, publicly embraced concern of so many lenders, donors, international organizations, and governments, including the 191 member states of the United Nations, who at the 2005 UN World Summit reaffirmed their commitment to the Millennium Declaration and its eight bold Millennium Development Goals regarding the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance, and improved global security.

So what is good governance? Can it be measured and compared in meaningful ways from one country to the next? The World Bank Institute defines it as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good." These include: 1) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced; 2) the capacity of the government to manage its resources effectively and implement sound policies; and 3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.¹

The UN's Millennium Project notes that there are two very distinct underlying causes for what is termed "poor governance." One is corrupt leadership, as when a state is run for the benefit of a narrow clique or elite. The other is governance that is weak not so much because of poor

leadership as because the state lacks the funds and technical capacity needed for efficient public administration. The key is “to invest in improving governance by promoting the rule of law; political and social rights; sound economic policies; accountable and efficient public administration and by supporting civil society.”²

Good governance is hampered by the problem of corruption—a problem whose relative absence is, conversely, a strong sign that a country is nearing the goal of at least reasonably good governance. International organizations, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private investors have been trying to find ways in which they can measure things such as the extent and severity of corruption.

Currently, data collected through original surveys, expert assessments, and composite indices are used—often without sufficient critical scrutiny—to rank countries according to democratic quality, human development, perceived levels of corruption, and press freedom. Well-known examples of such ranking efforts include the UNDP’s Human Development Index and Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World survey of political rights and civil liberties, as well as Transparency International’s oft-cited Corruption Perceptions Index. In the absence of better gauges, those who must make aid or investment decisions have come to rely on these in order to make the best-informed choices they can about where to give or lend funds or other scarce development resources.

It is, moreover, no longer only foreign donors or investors who care about improving and measuring governance. Citizens around the globe, and particularly in developing countries, are also eager to see their governments perform better. Ordinary people are increasingly aware that mismanagement and abuses of public trust cost them dearly—indeed, are fundamental in retarding overall economic and social development—and that governments must learn to use scarce resources more effectively. Citizens want and need help both with diagnosing governance failures and with finding solutions. Interest has never been higher in questions of how to assess and improve state performance using indicators of governance and institutional quality.

How to satisfy this vital interest? Measuring multidimensional phenomena such as governance, democracy, and corruption is tricky even for the ablest social scientists. Numerical indicators alone are generally not highly reliable, but more qualitative approaches—such as those that focus on how corrupt citizens and businesspeople *feel* a government to be—have their drawbacks as well.³

Therefore, an approach that encompasses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the problem is best. The time is ripe for a fresh method that goes beyond sole reliance on general perceptions of corruption’s incidence in a country as gleaned from surveys of citizens and businesspeople. To this end, a new NGO called Global Integrity has

INTEGRITY SCORECARD: SOUTH AFRICA

CATEGORY 1	CIVIL SOCIETY, PUBLIC INFORMATION, AND MEDIA	89	Strong
I-1	Civil-Society Organizations	100	Very Strong
I-2	Access to Information Law	77	Moderate
I-3	Freedom of the Media	92	Very Strong
CATEGORY 2	ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES	65	Weak
II-1	National Elections	93	Very Strong
II-2	Election-Monitoring Agency	95	Very Strong
II-3	Political Party Finances	6	Very Weak
CATEGORY 3	BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT	84	Strong
III-1	Executive	81	Strong
III-2	Legislature	85	Strong
III-3	Judiciary	86	Strong
CATEGORY 4	ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE	69	Weak
IV-1	Civil-Service Regulations	53	Very Weak
IV-2	Whistle-Blowing Measures	50	Very Weak
IV-3	Procurement	81	Strong
IV-4	Privatization	92	Very Strong
CATEGORY 5	OVERSIGHT AND REGULATORY MECHANISMS	96	Very Strong
V-1	National Ombudsman	90	Strong
V-2	Supreme Audit Institution	96	Very Strong
V-3	Taxes and Customs	100	Very Strong
V-4	Financial-Sector Regulation	99	Very Strong
CATEGORY 6	ANTICORRUPTION MECHANISMS AND RULE OF LAW	81	Strong
VI-1	Anticorruption Law	63	Weak
VI-2	Anticorruption Agency	93	Very Strong
VI-3	Rule of Law and Access to Justice	94	Very Strong
VI-4	Law Enforcement	76	Moderate

devised a Public Integrity Index that measures something positive rather than negative (integrity rather than corruption) and does so through methods that are meant to be as transparent and as objective as possible. The focus throughout is on measuring the existence in law (*de jure*) and the effectiveness in practice (*de facto*) of institutions and practices that can help to control or reduce existing corruption, prevent future abuses of power, and promote more effective governance.

The Public Integrity Index currently covers 25 countries⁴ (soon to expand to 100) that have been chosen for the geographical, political, and economic diversity which, as a group, they reflect. Each country receives a number of grades on an Integrity Scorecard. In order to show what the end product is supposed to look like, the box above reproduces South Africa's Integrity Scorecard for 2004.

Improved means of measurement—based on transparent and objective indicators that can be acted upon and measured consistently over time—can play a role that is at once descriptive and diagnostic. Such

means can help policy makers to discern where and how to intervene in corrupt systems, can inform investment decisions, and can guide advocates of change on the ground.

Over the years, as rampant corruption has increasingly been associated with global development woes, security threats, and authoritarian regimes that callously disregard even the most basic aspects of their citizens' well-being, the scholarly literature devoted to corruption control has grown. The Transparency International *Source Book on Corruption* provides the theoretical basis for much of what one might call the "integrity-based" approach to controlling corruption. This holistic and systematic approach to anticorruption work maintains that there are certain "laws, institutions and practices in a country that maintain accountability and integrity of public, private and civil society organizations." This approach sees corruption "as part of the larger struggle against misconduct and misappropriation" and focuses on the need to create "an efficient and effective government working in the public interest, supported by a vital, transparent civil society and private sector."⁵

For some time now, the UN and other intergovernmental bodies have sporadically tried to compare how well various countries do at battling and preventing corruption. Given the complexity and extreme sensitivity of the problem, however, these exercises have failed to quantify bad governance on the basis of transparent indicators, and have produced no public ranking of countries on a globally applicable integrity scale. Transparency International has undertaken a number of in-depth country studies, called National Integrity Systems, in order to help give policy makers qualitative information on the systems and practices that scholars of anticorruption cite as key to preventing abuses of power (of which corruption is one type). These qualitative studies, while they lay useful groundwork for diagnostic and policy reform, also become quickly outdated and fail to capture the dynamics of political reform as it unfolds over time. Even more seriously, these studies do not take on the methodologically fraught but crucial task of attempting to organize and *quantify* information about anticorruption mechanisms and practices gathered by expert local observers on the ground in the various countries under examination. To take on that key task is the mission of Global Integrity's Public Integrity Index.

Generating the Public Integrity Index

The Public Integrity Index is the centerpiece of the *Global Integrity Report* (www.globalintegrity.org). The Index assesses what might be called "the positive flipside" of corruption: that is, the public integrity systems that citizens can count on (and in some cases, directly employ) to help keep their public officials honest, and to hold them accountable

should they go astray. The Index is therefore based on the assumption that the greater the presence of such public integrity systems, the less likely corruption is to be prevalent.

Based on referenced, peer-reviewed expert assessments, the Index rests upon 292 tangible indicators. Taken together, they provide clear windows on the state of anticorruption and governance systems in the 25 included countries. The 292 “integrity indicators” that the Index measures were chosen after a comprehensive examination of the academic literature on anticorruption. (The list of 292 also includes governance indicators that are considered universally applicable and necessary if abuses of power are to be prevented in a given polity.) These indicators, in turn, capture three dimensions relevant to preventing corruption and other abuses of power:

1. The *existence* of public integrity mechanisms, including laws and institutions, that promote public accountability and limit corruption;
2. The *effectiveness* of these mechanisms;
3. The *access* that citizens have to the information they need in order to hold public officials accountable.

As should be clear from what has been said so far, the Public Integrity Index does not measure corruption itself. Instead, the Index maps what might be thought of as the public integrity “topography” of a given country, revealing both its peaks and valleys when it comes to checking or preventing the abuse of power. The Index has more potential than do other, parallel tools for helping policy makers, citizens, investors, and reformers to reach not only broad assessments but also detailed diagnoses concerning a country’s anticorruption environment, for the scorecard conveys information about the particular strengths and weaknesses in the country’s institutionalized public integrity “architecture.” There can of course be “outlying” results in given cases—a country with strong anticorruption architecture may nonetheless experience misdealings, while a country with weak architecture need not actually be corruption-riddled. But on the whole, the presence and effective functioning of robust anticorruption systems are the surest means of keeping official behavior accountable and transparent while protecting the public interest from fraud and abuse.

Global Integrity’s staff consulted the ever-expanding international literature on good governance and corruption control in order to compile the most comprehensive possible list of integrity indicators, one that would capture *de facto* as well as *de jure* realities.⁶ The various dimensions making up the index represent on some level what Larry Diamond calls “a comprehensive system of intersecting accountability mechanisms.”⁷ The 6 main categories and 21 subcategories reflect the most important dimensions of anticorruption reform. The categories and subcategories are listed in the box on page 157.

Each of the 292 indicators that make up the Public Integrity Index

PUBLIC INTEGRITY INDEX CATEGORIES AND SUBCATEGORIES	
1. CIVIL SOCIETY, PUBLIC INFORMATION, AND MEDIA	4. ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL SERVICE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil-society organizations • Access to information • Freedom of the media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil-service regulations • Measures to protect whistle-blowers • Procurement • Privatization
2. ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES	5. OVERSIGHT AND REGULATORY MECHANISMS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National elections • Election-monitoring agency • Political-party finances 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National ombudsman • Supreme auditing agency • Taxes and customs • Financial-sector regulation
3. BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT	6. ANTI-CORRUPTION MECHANISMS AND RULE OF LAW
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive • Legislative • Judicial 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anticorruption law • Corruption-fighting agency • Rule of law and access to justice • Law enforcement

fits under one of these subcategories. Each indicator must be something that can be scored, and each one is supported by references to research and by a set of comments clearly explaining what the indicator is and why it is significant. To provide a crosscheck, Global Integrity has created a system of peer reviews and fact-checking that generates detailed comments on the indicators and the draft of each country report. The guiding idea is to make the *Global Integrity Report* an invaluable resource for decision makers, activists, and researchers.

The Global Integrity Network

The Public Integrity Index is the product of coordinated efforts by a large group of social scientists and journalists, the vast bulk of whom live in the various countries included in the Index. To identify appropriate social scientists, journalists, and peer reviewers, Global Integrity's staff drew on Web searches, bibliographies, attendance records from conferences on corruption, and personal contacts in order to assemble a list of individuals and organizations that do serious work in the field of governance reform.

After months of extensive background research, the Global Integrity team identified hundreds of potential candidates, and from these chose 150 social scientists whose résumés were requested. Further evaluation culminated in the choice of one social scientist per country who was judged most qualified to comment on governance and corruption issues, and these 25 received contracts containing specific instructions. The tasks set forth in the contracts included the collection of baseline

data and scores for each Integrity Indicator, as well as the preparation of a 3,000-word Integrity Assessment. The key factors in recruitment decisions were academic qualifications and a record of publications in the

The Index scores are meant to be transparent—each stage of the aggregation process is public, from subindicator scores up to the final country score.

field of governance reform. The names of finalists not selected as lead social scientists were kept on record, and many of them later took part in peer-review panels focused on the country of their expertise.

Most of the lead social scientists were affiliated with a university or an established research organization. Since the field of public integrity is too broad to fall entirely within any one person's sphere of competence, the lead social scientist was chosen in part on the strength of his or her proven access to a network of resources and information in all areas covered by the Integrity Indicators. With regard to each Integrity Indicator, the lead social scientists did most of the initial scoring work, wrote up comments, and unearthed supporting references.

In tandem with the recruitment of social scientists went that of leading journalists. The Center for Public Integrity's International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) helped to locate preeminent investigative journalists in each country. Created in 1997, ICIJ now counts as members more than 90 leading investigative reporters and editors in 48 countries. In countries where ICIJ does not yet have a presence, Global Integrity offered contracts to leading independent journalists. Besides writing a "corruption notebook" (a 2,000-word essay that provides a ground-level qualitative view of the state of corruption in a particular country), each journalist also lent his or her expertise to the double-blind peer-review process that vetted the country reports at the draft stage.⁸

To coordinate all this effort, Global Integrity created a password-protected Web site as a place where work could be contributed and securely shared. In all, 25 social scientists, 25 journalists, 128 readers and a dedicated staff in Washington, D.C., contributed to the final Index scores and the *Global Integrity Report*.

The questions about the various integrity indicators that each lead social scientist had to answer came in two varieties. The first type consisted of yes-or-no questions about the situation "in law" (meaning not only statutes but also relevant court cases and regulations). The second type asked about how things stood "in practice." These latter questions mostly had to do with issues of implementation. As such, they were inherently too subjective to admit of binary answers, and so typically were answered according to a five-point sliding scale. The scores deter-

mined by the answers assigned to these two types of questions had to range between 0 and 100, with the former value indicating the least-possible integrity and 100 being a perfect score.

From the final Integrity Indicator scores arose the Public Integrity Index. Any reader using the Index can access sound and comprehensive information about the anticorruption environment in any of the 25 countries included, and can seek guidance within the Index about where to go for more in-depth information in the various country reports.

The Index scores are meant to be transparent—each stage of the aggregation process is public, from subindicator scores up to the final country score. This allows researchers to use subcomponents of the Index to produce scorecards tailored to specific areas of focus, or to produce a category-level scorecard which, for instance, could draw attention to particular weaknesses in a country's anticorruption regime. Index scores are on a scale of zero to 100. As with indicator scores, zero is the worst possible country score; 100 is the best. All numbers presented to the general public are rounded to the nearest whole number.

The Index's aggregation method is fairly simple: Each of the six dimensions is weighted equally. The social scientists and the reviewers assign the definitive subindicator and indicator scores. Each indicator score is then averaged within its parent subcategory, which produces a subcategory score. The subcategory score is in turn averaged with the other subcategory scores in a parent category. Category scores are then averaged to produce a country score. For instance, in the six parent categories that represent the key dimensions of public integrity, South Africa scores in the "very strong" tier (90 to 100) for Category 5; in the "strong" tier (80 to 90) for Categories 1, 3, and 6; and in the "weak" tier (60 to 70) for Categories 2 and 4. In overall terms, therefore, South Africa is rated as a "strong" country when it comes to fostering public integrity.

Because some aspects of governance integrity are harder to measure, some categories require a more complex matrix of questions than others. Yet the categories are valued equally, even if some are derived from lengthier lists of questions than others. Similarly, the subcategories are equally weighted, albeit only *within each parent category*. Global Integrity's approach of using equally valued major concepts and adding subordinate elements as needed has produced score weightings that reflect the six main conceptual categories. The categories, one should add, are meant to apply solely at the national level. The Public Integrity Index does not reflect the subnational variations in the governance and public integrity situation that may be common in some federal states, for instance.

In generating the Index, initial data (both scores and narrative) gathered by the lead social scientist underwent four interactive rounds of substantive review over and above stylistic revisions and copyediting. These four phases of the review process served to strengthen the integrity of the Index as a research tool. They may be summed up as follows:

1) Interpretation. The scoring committee reviewed commentary provided by the lead social scientist to ensure a uniform application of each indicator. Because highly specific questions are asked in diverse contexts, accurate application of a consistent approach is crucial to obtaining reliable data. This process involved dialogue with the lead social scientist and was repeated during later review stages. To address problems of interpretation, a Frequently Asked Questions section formed part of the data-entry site for social scientists during the fieldwork stage. By the time future studies are underway, Global Integrity plans to have prepared a codebook that will offer detailed descriptions of each indicator and possible scores.

2) Peer review. After editing and corrections based on interpretation, each dataset was posted online for comment from a panel of carefully selected social scientists and journalists. These comments indicated which scores panelists disagreed with, and included explanations for their dissent. The entire process was double-blind: The lead social scientists did not know who was reviewing their work, and the reviewers did not know on whose research they were commenting. Reader comments were used to interpret—and in some cases adjust—scores that reviewers identified as containing errors, bias, or out-of-date information. In order to adjust a score, Global Integrity's staff generally required similar comments from several reviewers or else the provision of solid references to settle disagreements over questions of fact.

3) Indicator evaluation. Based on feedback from the field teams and the double-blind peer reviews, several indicators were cut from the final report. Only indicators judged to be distinct, universally valid, and reliable were included in the final set of Integrity Indicators.

4) Intercoder reliability. Personality, language, and culture can all affect the relationship between the qualitative interpretation of a particular indicator and the score assigned to it. To minimize this effect, the scoring committee examined each indicator for consistency among scorers. Using the qualitative descriptions and reader commentary, the scoring committee examined the full set of scores and in some cases, score adjustments were made to ensure intercoder reliability.

The Integrity Scorecard

Integrity indicators for each country were aggregated via the simple method described above to produce a quantitative Integrity Scorecard of governance practices. With the Integrity Scorecard, it is now possible to take in almost at a glance the pattern of strengths and weaknesses that stretches across the half-dozen main categories and 21 subcategories that describe a given country's public integrity system.

To present the findings regarding all 25 countries in a coherent graphic format, countries are grouped into five tiers, ranging from those with

“very weak” public integrity systems to those whose systems are on average “very strong.”

In the 2004 Public Integrity Index, no country scored in the *very strong* (90 to 100) tier. Just six ranked in the “strong” (80 to 89) range: the United States, which ranked as having the best overall public integrity environment, followed by Portugal, Australia, Italy, Germany, and South Africa. Seven countries—the Philippines, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Venezuela, and Ghana—scored from 70 to 79 and hence received “moderate” rankings. Scoring from 60 to 69 and thus belonging to the “weak” category were Nigeria, Panama, Nicaragua, Ukraine, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Turkey, Russia, and Kenya. Guatemala and Zimbabwe, the remaining two countries surveyed, finished below 60 in the “very weak” category. The distribution and degree of variance among the countries showed an encouraging diversity among the countries chosen for the first iteration of the Public Integrity Index. It is hoped that the planned fourfold expansion of the list of countries covered will reveal further interesting trends.

In order to underscore how useful and robust the Integrity Scorecards can be in organizing governance information in a way that can inform policy, we present a detailed consideration of the scorecard for South Africa (see page 154). Overall, the country falls into the “strong” tier. It scores “very strong” in Category 5 and “strong” in Categories 1, 3 and 6, but “weak” in Categories 2 and 4. Such data-backed rankings can help policy makers, even under pressure and with scarce resources, home in on areas that require strengthening in the area of anticorruption “best practices.”

South Africa’s scorecard reveals four subcategories that especially warrant attention—namely 2.3 (political-party finances), 4.1 (civil-service regulations), 4.2 (whistle-blowing measures), and 6.1 (anticorruption law). Of the main categories, 2 and 4 (Electoral and Political Processes and Administration and Civil Service, respectively) need improvement most urgently.

A closer look at Category 2 and its three subcategories is revealing, especially when coupled with the integrity-assessment narrative that accompanies the integrity indicators. The heart of the problem appears to be Subcategory 2.3 (party financing). The Integrity Assessment sums it up as follows:

The most glaring omission in electoral processes and accountability provisions is the lack of rules governing either the receipt or disclosure of private or foreign contributions to political parties. A public debate on this issue has been initiated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and other Civil Society Organizations. Using the Promotion of Access to Information Act, they have requested information from several political parties about monetary donations and contributions and requested disclosure information from top

companies on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE, formerly the Johannesburg Stock Exchange). The parties' failure to respond has resulted in a court case brought by Idasa. . . . Since there is no requirement for disclosure of private funds received, there are no audited political party accounts publicly available. At the moment, it is unclear which private or foreign interests support South Africa's political parties.⁹

A closer look at some of the individual integrity indicators that make up 2.3—namely 18 a) and b) on the laws governing contributions to political parties—delineates in even more detail why this subcategory score is so poor. Several of the scandals that are currently roiling South Africa's public life relate directly to the lack of regulation of both individual and private contributions to political parties. This is clearly an area that needs reform.

How Will the Index Help?

The Public Integrity Index offers several advantages. First, it is entirely transparent in both its scoring and the methodology behind the scoring. This means that users can learn not only *how* a country scored, but also see exactly *why* it scored as it did, down to the existence of an individual law or the performance of a specific institution. The Index's complete transparency means that it can tangibly demonstrate where there is a problem in a certain area of governance, such as South Africa's lack of adequate regulations to control political-party financing. Significantly, each aggregate score can be traced back to the disaggregated data (individual indicators) and narrative, so it is possible to see more or less exactly where the problem lies.

The Index is particularly useful for decision makers who wish to demonstrate empirically, using an independent data source, where the problems within a country's national governance framework lie, especially when it comes to controlling or (better yet) preventing official corruption. Both the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Corporation rely on information of this sort to make intelligent aid and allocation decisions, decisions that affect people's lives. Both the Bank and the Corporation have reacted favorably to Global Integrity's initiative and expressed strong interest in its future progress.

The Index's second major advantage consists of the indicators themselves. They are easily accessible online in a downloadable format, and the full set of disaggregated data allows users to mine the research and apply its findings as tests of their own theories about how corruption may be most effectively controlled. Most importantly, the integrity indicators provide a checklist of simple, incremental steps that governments can take to "step up their game" when it comes to battling corruption. As such, the Index can be a tool that civil society groups may use when conferring with governments and trying to persuade offi-

cials to define and agree to achievable improvements in the public integrity environment.

The Public Integrity Index is *not* meant to be a stick with which to shame and belabor poor performers. Instead, the scores are diagnostic, highlighting opportunities for improvement in a country's ensemble of anticorruption ways and means. Moreover, when improvements are made, the Index will upgrade a country's relevant scores to reflect both the fact of these improvements and (if applicable) their actual positive effects. This makes for a strong contrast with existing perception-based indices, which rely on opinion polls that change only gradually if at all, and so almost never succeed in capturing progress from one year to the next. Global Integrity's positive approach recognizes that not even the thickest-skinned official or most cynical journalist likes to hear that his or her country is corrupt, and it avoids the counterproductive ill feeling that can all too easily arise from a "name and shame" approach that dwells on problems rather than solutions. The feedback on the Index from within the listed countries has so far been extremely positive.

In designing the methodology, Global Integrity's team made choices that inevitably affect the utility of the research instrument. For one, we chose to restrict the analysis to the national level, even though much corruption goes on at subnational levels of government. Unpacking the "rules of the game" at the national level was seen as a way to assess the national political will to control corruption. It is unclear, however, to what extent if any this approach can be valid in the case of fragile or failed states, where the central government by definition has little or no real power.

Some, moreover, might find the Index's exclusive focus on the public sector to be unfortunate, since so much corruption happens in dealings between the public and private sectors (though it should be noted that Global Integrity does score indicators relating to privatization, conflict-of-interest regulations, and financing of the political process). There was a conscious choice to restrict the research to the public-sector governance framework, the rationale being that it is up to governments to establish "the rules of the game" for *public* integrity, and this was the focus of our report. Another criticism of the Index deprecates its focus on *institutions*. Countries with badly pinched resources, critics complained, may make institutional choices that could in and of themselves unduly prejudice those countries' index scores. We recognized this pitfall and in compiling the Index sought to guard against it by trying, whenever possible, to recognize functional equivalences even in the absence of a specific, sought-after institution. Mainstream academic studies of anticorruption, moreover, support our decision to make institutions a focus.

Since the Public Integrity Index first came out in April 2004, Global Integrity's experts have given numerous presentations at campuses, semi-

nars, and conferences around the world to share the methodology and findings of the report. There has been consistent interest and enthusiastic support for both the approach of the project and its continuation, particularly from bodies such as the World Bank that find themselves under mounting pressure to produce publicly accessible data justifying the decisions that they make.

If the Public Integrity Index project is to fulfill its founders' vision and provide a sustained and regular stream of independent, relevant, and credible information on anticorruption reforms, three challenges will have to be met.

The first is to *institutionalize* the Index by raising enough money to establish a new and dedicated international entity to carry on the research. In September 2005, Global Integrity was incorporated in Washington, D.C., as a stand-alone nonprofit organization. It thus became a completely independent international NGO, after having been nurtured under the wing of another NGO, the Center for Public Integrity.

The second challenge will be to *improve* and fine-tune the Index's methods and choice of indicators based on lessons learned during the first, 25-country run in 2003 and 2004. This will include working with a group of experts on methodology to compile a comprehensive codebook. Ideally, the improved set of indicators will become the subject of an annual, hundred-country study, with a focus on getting experts from each region of the world involved as key players in the effort.

The third and final challenge for Global Integrity will be to *inform* by communicating, publicizing, and explaining its findings more effectively in each country. Our goal is to become the governance "community's" relied-upon, unbiased source of sound data and information on governance and corruption. More analysis and reporting can only aid the cause of advancing reform on the ground, and Global Integrity's goal of becoming the "industry standard" information provider will enhance those efforts.

As the twenty-first century rolls on, decisions about where to deploy aid and investment money are going to be based on various factors that can be assigned negative or positive value as quantifiable indicators. The murky, complex issue of corruption is always going to be less than perfectly clear-cut and unambiguous. It will remain critically important for those in the business of measuring it to keep questioning how they do what they do, and to strive both for better information and for better tools with which to collect and analyze it.

NOTES

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1. World Bank Institute, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.

2. United Nations Millennium Project, "What About Corruption and Governance?" available at www.unmillenniumproject.org/facts/qa12_e.htm.

3. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), put out annually by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International and accessible at www.transparency.org, is the best-known attempt to promote integrity in governance by ranking countries according to how corrupt people think their governments are. While the CPI may once have been useful in spurring shady governments to increase transparency, its inability to capture trends toward concrete reform and in this way reward genuine improvers is a major flaw that has begun to generate nontrivial amounts of justifiable irritation. Fredrik Galtung, Transparency International's own former research chief, agrees that the CPI's all-stick-no-carrot approach needs changing. As he puts it: "It is all but impossible to improve scores in the CPI through government reforms and sustained anti-corruption efforts. . . . The challenge ahead is evident: After ten years it is time to find new measurements!" Fredrik Galtung, "Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices," in Fredrik Galtung and C. Sampford, eds., *Measuring Corruption* (London: Ashgate, 2005).

4. The 25 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

5. Transparency International, "National Integrity Systems: Country Studies," www.transparency.org/activities/nat_integ_systems/country_studies.html.

6. Sources used include the U.S. Agency for International Development's *Handbook on Democracy and Governance Program Indicators* (1998); Transparency International's report, "The National Integrity System: Concept and Practice" (2001); the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs's *Public Service Ethics in Africa*, vols. 1 and 2 (2001); the UN's Convention Against Corruption (2003), available at www.unodc.org/unodc/crime-convention-corruption.html; the UNDP's Discussion Paper 3 on "Corruption and Good Governance," 1997; the Commonwealth Secretariat Expert Group's *Fighting Corruption, Promoting Good Governance* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001); and the OECD's book, *Public Sector Corruption: An International Survey of Prevention Measures* (London: OECD Publishing, 1999).

7. Larry Diamond, "Building a System of Comprehensive Accountability to Control Corruption," in Adigun A.B. Agbaje, Larry Diamond, and Ebere Onwudiwe, eds., *Nigeria's Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance: A Festschrift for Oyeleye Oyediran* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 2004), 221–40.

8. Center for Public Integrity, *The Corruption Notebooks: 25 Investigative Journalists Report on Abuses of Power in Their Home Country* (Washington, D.C.: Public Integrity Books, 2005).

9. Center for Public Integrity, "South Africa Integrity Assessment" in *Global Integrity Report 2004* (Washington, D.C.: Public Integrity Books, 2004).